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The Archive as an Artefact of Conflict: The North Iraq Dataset 
An uprising in the Kurdish regions of northern Iraq in 1991 against the rule of 
the central government led to the overthrow of the Baʿth regime’s institutions. 
During the revolt, members of the public and of Kurdish political groups seized 
large amounts of official records. The regime responded to the revolt brutally 
and retook the regions within three weeks. However, the records, the bulk of 
which were created by the government’s security offices, had been hidden 
away. In the following two years, Kurdish groups reached agreements with the 
United States government and an international non-governmental organization 
to ship the records to the US, where they were formed into an archive. 
Approaching the archive as a site of political struggle, this paper explores how 
the capture, movement and de-territorialization of the records have shaped the 
archive. The trajectory of the records illustrates the ways in which their value 
and potential uses shifted within new socio-political contexts that emerged as a 
result of the conflict.  





































































In March 1991 uprisings swept through the south and then north of Iraq, 
constituting the most serious internal challenge to Saddam Hussein’s rule since his 
ascent to power. The revolt was a response to the decades of persecution the central 
authorities had subjected the communities of the regions to (Goldstein and Middle 
East Watch (MEW) 1992, 29). In the predominantly Kurdish regions of the north, the 
insurrection saw civilians and peshmerga, the fighting forces of various Kurdish 
political groups, storm and ransack the buildings of government, secret police, 
intelligence, and Baʿth Party agencies. As the institutions of the regime were overrun, 
large amounts of documents were captured (Human Rights Watch (HRW) 1994). 
Within three weeks, central Iraqi troops had regained control over most of the regions 
in a brutal crackdown that sent a surge of refugees fleeing into the neighbouring 
countries. In the interim period, Kurdish political groups had stowed the documents in 
their possession away in secure locations in their mountain strongholds (Montgomery 
2017, 162). The regime’s suppression of the uprising eventually led to a partial loss of 
sovereignty over Iraqi territory (Rhode 2010, 51). As a result of the crackdown, the 
allies in the Gulf War intervened in northern Iraq and established a safe zone. By 
October 1991, Iraqi government forces withdrew from the majority of the Kurdish-
populated areas in northern Iraq and human rights researchers arrived with the aim of 
gathering evidence that could be used to charge the Iraqi leadership with war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and genocide (Hiltermann 2000, 33). In 1992 and 1993, 
Kurdish political parties signed agreements with the US Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee that led to the captured documents being airlifted to the US so they could 
be scanned and analyzed. There they were digitized by the Defense Intelligence 




































































digitized copy of the collection, later named the North Iraq Dataset (NIDS), remains 
available to researchers at the Hoover Institution in Stanford University. The 
trajectory of the records, as they passed through hands and changed locations, 
illustrate how their value and potential uses shifted within new socio-political 
contexts established by the rebellion and its aftermath.  
 
Created by security, intelligence, military, Baʿth Party, and other government 
agency offices in the northern governorates of Iraq, the records document the period 
of the Saddam Hussein regime’s consolidation of power, the Iran-Iraq war, the 
Kurdish insurgency, the Anfal military campaign of 1987-1988, and the prelude to the 
1991 Gulf War.1 Estimates as to the number of documents have varied widely, but the 
Hoover states that the NIDS collection is comprised of 2.4 million pages (Hoover 
Institution collection guide n.d.). They include records of mass executions, large-scale 
disappearances, targeted assassinations, torture and the forced expulsion or 
deportation of civilians (HRW 2004). The documents also detail the methods and 
procedures of the intelligence agencies, which were tasked with vetting citizens, 
assessing loyalty to the regime, uncovering dissent, and coercing members of the 
public into surveillance activities and the monitoring of their peers (Iraq Documents 
at Hoover Reference Guide 2013). When the regime lost this tool of surveillance and 
                                                 
1 When US forces removed the records from the Kurdish regions, they signed agreements 
stating that the files were the property of the Kurdish groups that had seized them. Ownership 
over the original materials has been contested, with some commentators considering them to 
be the property of the Kurdish peoples whose lives they recorded, and others arguing that they 
are the property of the current Iraqi government as the successor to the government that 
created them (SAA/ACA 2008; Montgomery 2011). Given that the records are contested 
property, I have elected to not engage the copies that remain available to researchers at the 
Hoover Institution. The archival research for this paper was conducted in the Kanan Makiya 
Papers, which are also deposited at the Hoover Institution. Makiya, a long-term opponent of 
the Baʿth Party, travelled to northern Iraq in 1991 after hearing of the existence of the 
captured files. His papers include correspondence with various US-based actors concerning 
efforts towards transferring the files out of Iraq. I also held interviews with Makiya and 




































































control during the revolt, both the material state and epistemological status of the 
records evolved. The uprising led to the destruction and damage of records, dictating 
what materially remained in existence and sometimes leaving physical traces on 
surviving documents. Then the socio-political changes brought about through the 
rebellion determined who controlled the records and how they could be put to use. 
 
Across the world, armed conflict regularly leads to the seizure and 
displacement of archives, prized for their legal, informative, financial or cultural 
value (Auer 2017, 114). Between 1992 and 2018, six major displacements of 
documents from Iraq were facilitated by US-based actors, including the military, 
government agencies, humanitarian organizations and journalists (Bet-Shlimon 2018; 
Society of American Archivists/Association of Canadian Archivists 2008). In each 
instance the de-territorialization of the archival collections, many of which were state 
and Baʿth Party records, was triggered through conflict. The sheer scale of Iraq’s loss 
of its documentary heritage through destruction, capture and displacement during war 
is perhaps unparalleled in recent history (Montgomery 2017, 159). Globally, the 
displacement of archives is often politically motivated, with searches for intelligence 
materials and evidence to refute or support war crime charges being prevalent motives 
for capturing records (Auer 2017, 122). As different actors have sought control over 
Iraq’s archives, the successive displacements over the years are a reflection of the 
evolving values foreign forces have placed on Iraq’s documentary heritage. Unlike 
the other displaced Iraqi archives, the NIDS was initially seized by insurgent forces 
within Iraq and custody later transferred to a foreign power. The displacement was a 
result of international interest in the documents growing in accordance with changing 




































































developments as they occurred in relation to conflict in the Gulf and the 1991 
uprising. 
 
Contemporary critical archival theories approach archives as the continually 
evolving products of a series of choices regarding what is selected for preservation, 
how it is organized and how it is made accessible. The shape of the archive results 
from societal processes and discourses that take place in relation to the institutional 
powers behind the custody of historical narratives (Hamilton et al 2002, 7-17; 
Ketelaar 2005). As Antoinette Burton aptly wrote, ‘archives do not simply arrive or 
emerge fully formed; nor are they innocent of struggles for power in either their 
creation or their interpretive applications. Though their origins are often occluded 
and the exclusions on which they are premised often dimly understood, all archives 
come into being in and as history as a result of specific political, cultural, and 
socioeconomic pressures – pressures which leave traces and which render archives 
themselves artefacts of history’ (Burton 2005, 6). The NIDS archive is a product of 
societal and political processes and pressures within the context of conflict and the 
ensuing international intervention in Iraq. Choices as to what was preserved, how the 
records were organized and how and to whom they were made accessible were 
governed by the destructiveness of war, the course of the uprising, the domestic 
environment in its wake, and then by international political developments.  
 
This paper aims to add to existing literature on displaced archives by applying 
critical archival theory to analysis of the NIDS as a site of political struggle during 
conflict and in its wake. This struggle is mapped out through the trajectory of the 
archive, which was dictated by the different, and sometimes opposing values various 




































































international socio-political landscape. Previous research on the NIDS documents has 
aimed to ‘explore the nature of these materials, their provenance and contents, and 
what they reveal about the bureaucratic machinations of the Iraqi police state’ 
(Montgomery 2001, 71). This paper approaches the NIDS as an artefact of the 1991 
uprising and its aftermath. Its history begins with the Baʿth Party rule in the Kurdish 
regions of northern Iraq as the context in which the records functioned as a tool of 
repression. 
 
The Kurdish Regions of Iraq 
The NIDS records were created by the Baʿth Party within the predominantly 
Kurdish regions of northern Iraq: Sulaimaniyya, Dohuk and Arbil, which had long 
been the base for Kurdish as well as other opposition parties (Khoury 2013, 15). Since 
the founding of the Kingdom of Iraq in 1921, the Kurds had periodically waged a 
nationalist insurgency against the central government as repeated promises of political 
autonomy and national rights under various administrations were not met (Khoury 
2013, 22). After the fall of the monarchy in 1958, the oil-rich regions of the north 
were subjected to systematic ‘Arabization’ politics from successive central 
governments (Rohde 2010, 37). In 1968, the Baʿth Party seized power in Iraq. An 
agreement between Kurdish leaders and the Baʿth regime was reached in 1970 
assuring limited autonomy to the Kurds. However, in the face of continued 
Arabization policies, conflict flared again (Khoury 2013, 23). Kurdish peshmerga 
forces fought the Iraqi army almost continuously throughout the 1970s (Rohde 2010, 
28). In attempts to inhibit further organized Kurdish rebellion, the Iraqi government 
proceeded to initiate the large-scale displacement of Kurdish communities and the 




































































600,000 villagers had been displaced and around 1,400 villages had been destroyed 
(Marr and al-Marashi 2017, 123). The regime’s attempts at quelling resistance were 
unsuccessful and by the 1980s insurgencies began to constitute a serious threat to the 
government as Kurdish groups took control over large segments of the northern 
countryside while Iraqi troops were engaged in the 1980-88 war with Iran.   
 
In March 1987, Saddam Hussein’s cousin and the former head of the secret 
police, Ali Hassan al-Majid, was appointed chief of the Baʿth Party Northern Bureau 
and tasked with suppressing the Kurdish rebellion (Hiltermann 2007, 6-7, 93). al-
Majid began orchestrating the use of poison gases against the communities of the 
Kurdish regions, initially targeting the headquarters and strongholds of the main 
political parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party (KDP) whose forces lived amongst civilian villages. Between April 
and June 1987 over 500 Kurdish villages were cleared and destroyed. Communities 
were displaced to camps and those who resisted were killed (Marr and al-Marashi 
2017, 157). On 16 March 1988, a chemical attack on the Kurdish village of Halabja 
killed several thousand people. This attack was followed by the military’s six-month 
Anfal (Arabic for ‘Spoils’) counterinsurgency campaign. During the campaign the 
Iraqi military fired gas shells and dropped bombs containing poison gas on villages 
where Kurdish forces had bases. The villagers that fled the attacks were rounded up 
and men and boys aged 15 and over were separated from their families, executed and 
buried in mass graves. Women and children were sent to resettlement camps or 
sometimes also executed. 80,000 Kurds, the vast majority civilians, died during the 






































































The Iraqi regime had carried out the Anfal massacres in an attempt to 
guarantee its control over the oil-rich and strategically valuable northern regions. The 
Baʿth Party’s nationwide policy of monopolizing power in the hands of a few elite 
meant that it could only maintain rule through repressive means (Rohde 2010, 40).  
Within this context of repression, resistance and conflict, the documents that form the 
NIDS functioned as a tool of surveillance and social control within the Kurdish 
governorates. The regime operated through ‘a comprehensive system of oppression by 
procedures,’ which relied heavily on a ‘documentation imperative’ (Iraq Documents 
at Hoover Reference Guide 2013). A large percentage of the NIDS consists of the 
paperwork of the regime’s security agencies in the regions. The documents show the 
ways in which information on citizens was continuously gathered, their every 
movement and action recorded (Mneimneh n.d.). The General Directorate of Security, 
for example, functioned to ‘vet, rate, and grade loyalty to the regime, to weed out any 
dissent, and to leverage any need or request presented by citizens towards their 
incorporation in the web of surveillance and monitoring’ (Iraq Documents at Hoover 
Reference Guide 2013). Details of the extended family members of supposed 
opponents to the regime were amassed and violence threatened against them to ensure 
compliance (Frontline 1992). Detentions, interrogations, torture and summary 
executions are all neatly recorded in the secret police files. Under a regime that 
operated through such extensive surveillance tactics, the records facilitated control 
over social and political life. The 1991 revolt enabled Kurdish groups to re-




































































Conflict: War and Rebellion 
In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, drawing the main strength of the Iraqi 
army into the occupation of its neighbour. Saddam Hussein had believed he would 
have the backing of the international community, but his miscalculations quickly 
became apparent when the invasion was widely condemned.  In January 1991, the US 
led a coalition of 28 countries in an aerial attack that devastated Iraq’s military and 
civil infrastructure (Khoury 2013, 35, 36). Hussein’s army was defeated by the allied 
forces by the end of February. Immediately after the Gulf War ceasefire agreement, 
the first broad popular uprising against the regime erupted in Iraq, with major popular 
revolts taking place in the south and in the Kurdish regions in the north (Rhode 2010, 
50). In the north, all the major towns in Sulaimaniyya, Dohuk and Arbil fell under the 
control of Kurdish political groups and the local population as government forces 
retreated. The victory was, however, short-lived. Forces loyal to the regime regrouped 
and launched a counteroffensive in both the north and south, resulting in high civilian 
casualties (Goldstein and MEW 1992, 31). In the north, central Iraqi troops regained 
control of much of the regions within three weeks, sending hundreds of thousands of 
refugees fleeing into neighbouring countries. Next to the Anfal campaign, the 
suppression of the 1991 uprisings was one of the most violent chapters in the Baʿth 
regime’s history, and eventually led to a partial loss of sovereignty over Iraqi territory 
(Rhode 2010, 51).  
 
The uprising had spread rapidly due to the perception that Iraqi security forces 
were weakened through their recent crushing military defeat in Kuwait. Staff of 
Middle East Watch (MEW), a branch of HRW, later interviewed Kurdish refugees 
about the motives behind the revolt. They cited the persecution at the hands of the 




































































countryside, the destruction of villages, and the use of chemical weapons against 
civilians (Goldstein and MEW 1992, 30). As the revolt gained momentum, masses of 
unarmed or lightly armed civilians and small contingents of peshmerga took to the 
cities’ streets. Shouting anti-regime slogans, they attacked government buildings, 
particularly targeting the offices of the security forces. Regime forces fought back, 
but were either killed, captured or allowed to flee. In many towns there were 
considerable casualties to both sides. When the rebels gained control of a town, they 
opened the regime's prisons and interrogation centres, seizing small caches of 
weapons  (Goldstein and MEW 1992, 30). Peshmerga fighters from different Kurdish 
political groups and individual civilians captured large amounts of documents from 
the facilities of the state and Baʿth Party. These documents included arrest warrants, 
background information on suspects, and investigation reports (HRW 1994). From the 
moment that the revolt overthrew the local institutions of central government power, 
the documents ceased to be the current, functioning records of the regime; they 
became a site of political struggle as different actors sought to control them.  
 
The physical condition of the captured documents varied in accordance with 
the events of the uprisings in their locations of origin. In some towns, government 
officials surrendered their positions with little resistance. Documents seized from 
facilities in these areas were removed in essentially pristine condition. In other towns, 
such as Sulaimaniyya, heavy fighting took place. The security agency's headquarters 
were held under siege and the building was subjected to severe fire damage. Many of 
the documents that survived from this particular office bear scorch marks. In other 
towns where intense fighting took place, documents were often trampled during the 




































































stuck together and crumpled (HRW 1994). These physical imprints on the documents 
are traces of the conflict in their towns and buildings of origin; they are a record of the 
course of the rebellion and an addition of material information to the documents. 
 
The movements and composition of the collections of surviving documents 
also provide information about the actors involved in the conflict across the regions. 
In towns where the Kurdish political groups were not initially involved in the 
fighting, civilians taking part in storming government agencies often took files away 
with them. They were seeking information about missing family members, or 
sometimes searching for the files the agencies had kept on themselves. They would 
take documents of relevance home and discard any materials they obtained that were 
not of personal import. In areas where the Kurdish political parties orchestrated the 
rebellion, they would locate the agencies’ records and guard them carefully until they 
were able to move them to secure locations (HRW 1994). The documents were highly 
valuable for the political groups as they hoped to gain information as to whether their 
ranks had been penetrated by Iraqi intelligence agents (Montgomery 2001, 75). The 
Kurdish political parties later issued calls throughout the communities for documents 
to be handed in, and while some were collected it is known that a percentage 
remained in private homes (HRW 1994). Having amassed what they could of the 
surviving documents after the initial battles during the uprising, the Kurdish political 
groups moved them to their strongholds in the mountain regions. At this stage in their 
displacement the files were formed into new collections. At least eight Kurdish 
political organizations held custody over different collections of files they had 





































































The factors that determined what aspects of the Baʿth records were destroyed, 
seized, what kept in private homes and what amassed by political groups resulted 
from the social and political contexts formed in the wake of the rebellion, evidence of 
the new forms of emerging societal power. As the functioning records of the state and 
Baʿth Party in the northern governorates, in their creation and their use the documents 
reflected the power relations between the regime and society. The lives of the 
population were documented in great detail; information was constantly amassed, 
allowing the regime the power to potentially incriminate or coerce anyone it chose to 
(Mneimneh, n.d.). Within the Iraqi mechanisms of governance, the records had never 
been accessible to anyone operating outside of the administrative processes of the 
state and Baʿth Party. Through the uprising, this aspect of power was wrested from 
the regime and inverted as new forces arose in the vacuum created by the absence of 
its repressive control. Through conflict the accessibility of the records, to certain 
actors, was restructured. Once they were displaced from Iraq the parameters of their 
accessibility inevitably again changed drastically. Through the numerous places and 
hands the records passed through, different constructs of power dictated who 
controlled them, who was able to interact with them, and under what conditions. 
These developments reflected the shifting socio-political contexts that emerged in the 
period after the revolt.  
 
Foreign Intervention 
The government forces’ response to the March rebellion was brutal. 
Thousands of civilians were killed by indiscriminate fire from regime tanks, artillery 
cannons and helicopters. When the security forces retook cities, people were executed 




































































thousands died on the journey (Goldstein and MEW 1992, 31, 32). Kurdish political 
leaders sought assistance from the international community, hoping for United 
Nations intervention and protection (Khoury 2013, 41). On 5 April 1991, the Security 
Council adopted Resolution 688, providing the legal basis for other nations to 
intervene in Iraq for humanitarian purposes and establish a ‘safe zone’ (United 
Nations Security Council 1991). This was the first time the Security Council had 
authorized interference in a state's domestic jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons 
(Gallant 1992, 904). The Resolution marked a period in history during which 
numerous actors within the international community began to advocate for 
humanitarian initiatives to have the power to supersede the sanctity of other nations’ 
sovereignty and independence. The US imposed a no-fly zone in northern Iraq and 
UN-administered safe havens were established. These developments allowed the 
Kurdish political leaders to negotiate an agreement with the central Iraqi government, 
which surrendered control over most of the Kurdish regions, withdrawing its military 
forces in October 1991. In 1992 the Kurds formed a regional government beyond the 
control of Baghdad (Khoury 2013, 42). 
 
The establishment of the safe zone also enabled foreign officials and human 
rights researchers to enter the Kurdish regions. They hoped to gather sufficient 
forensic and documentary evidence to charge Saddam Hussein and other high-ranking 
officials with war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide (Hiltermann 2000, 
33). Joost Hiltermann, the primary researcher for HRW on the Anfal campaign during 
the early 1990s, has argued that the international community had been well aware of 
the atrocities while they were taking place in the late 1980s. The lack of any 




































































the Kurds at the hands of Hussein’s regime was related to the US support of Baghdad 
in the Iran-Iraq war. (Hiltermann 2007, 138, 201). While the context of the safe zone 
provided researchers access to the Kurdish regions, interest in searching for evidence 
from government officials had only grown in response to wider international 
developments regarding the notions of universal human rights and foreign 
intervention. 
 
Not long after the uprising had taken place, a representative of the PUK, 
Barham Salih, contacted officials from the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
and HRW and informed them of the existence of the captured files (Hennerbichler 
and Montgomery 2014). Kanan Makiya, a US-based Iraqi academic and longstanding 
critic of the Baʿth Party, was also contacted by Salih and told about the large cache of 
records hidden in the Kurdish regions. An extraordinary network of actors affiliated 
with the US government, non-governmental organizations and academic institutions 
was mobilized into trying to get the records out of Iraq. The correspondence now 
stored in the Kanan Makiya Papers at the Hoover Institution indicates the intentions 
of some of the parties who hoped to gain custody of the documents, the different 
values they assigned to them and how they envisioned that they should be put to use. 
Makiya was based at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard University. 
Within the Kanan Makiya Papers archive is a copy of a Proposal Regarding 
Documents Currently in Iraqi Kurdistan dated 24 October 1991 signed by Makiya and 
Andrew Whitley, Executive Director of MEW. The document proposed a plan to 
house and safeguard the documents within a western university as a special archive so 
that they could be made available for scholarly research on modern Iraq and human 




































































1991). Subsequent letters between Makiya, Whitley and leaders of Kurdish groups 
show that tensions soon developed due to competing visions as to the future of the 
documents, their location and their potential uses.  
 
Makiya travelled to the Kurdish regions in November 1991 as an independent 
researcher coordinating with MEW in order to assess the documents’ contents and 
volume, as well as the logistics of transporting them out of Iraq. After meetings with 
leaders of the Kurdish parties, Makiya was taken to the secret locations where some 
of the collections were stored, sometimes in filing cabinets, sometimes in stacks of 
sacks filled with records, ID cards and letters, documentary traces of victims of the 
regime’s violence piled in the corner of a room (Frontline 1992). The physical 
makeup of the records as collections had been significantly reconstituted through 
battle, seizure and movement. Information that might have been gleaned from the 
order and context in which the central Iraqi authorities managed these records was 
destroyed, while a new context was created as a result of how the files were collected, 
maintained and used by the Kurdish groups.  
 
After his trip Makiya wrote to Whitley to discuss the ‘Iraq Archives Project.’ He 
stated that the Kurdish parties were completely aware of the value of what they held 
in their possession and that he had argued with several of the leaders as to the 
advantages of having the documents ‘properly studied’ outside of Iraq, as this would 
not be possible within the country (Correspondence from Kanan Makiya to Andrew 
Whitley, February 20, 1992). In the letter, Makiya mentioned actors in New York and 
Washington getting very excited about this ‘great prize in northern Iraq’ as well as his 




































































ascribed to the documents in abstraction; all the while they remain secreted away in 
the mountains of the Kurdish regions of Iraq, the extent of the information they 
contained was unknown to many of the actors in the US seeking to gain access to 
them. The Kurdish groups had initially valued the documents and taken efforts to 
preserve them for the information they potentially bore about informants. It was later 
that they came to see the documents as valuable as evidence of human rights abuses 
(Montgomery 2001, 75). This shift in value marks the entrance of the documents into 
an international sphere of politics and human rights discourse, in keeping with the 
developments in the international community’s support of humanitarian initiatives 
and Saddam Hussein’s fall from grace in the wake of his invasion of Kuwait. Human 
rights organizations and some US government officials sought control of the 
documents with the view to collate evidence for a human rights tribunal. Before the 
international community collectively condemned the regime’s atrocities, the 
documents were not conceived of as valuable as evidence. When the international 
political context changed, they were re-imagined as a weapon that could be deployed 
against Hussein. This evolution provided the framework within which new power 
structures would dictate the trajectory of the documents. 
 
Makiya, who during his trip had spent ‘many hours looking through the 
documents’, ascribed value to them according to a different imperative. He wrote to 
Whitley that his preliminary research trip had shown that the documents in the 
possession of the Kurdish groups did not contain a ‘smoking gun’ that could provide 
ammunition or evidence for indicting Saddam Hussein in the short term. He argued 
that the documents’ value was academic, lying in ‘the grinding banality and boring 




































































illuminate human rights abuses in Iraq (Correspondence from Kanan Makiya to 
Andrew Whitley, February 20, 1992). A second letter to Whitley reiterated Makiya’s 
view that the documents did not contain the ‘explosive’ evidence that Whitley 
believed them to hold, and would not be of use for political ends, namely establishing 
an international tribunal (Correspondence from Kanan Makiya to Andrew Whitley, 
February 25, 1992).  
 
The vision that Whitley, as the director of a humanitarian organization, held as 
to the potential uses of the documents can be seen in earlier letters he had written to 
Kurdish leaders. In a letter to the Chairman of the PUK, Jalal Talabani (later to 
become the President of Iraq), dated December 20, 1991, Whitley wrote that himself 
and Makiya were very pleased about Talabani’s decision to ‘permit the documents 
captured by your forces… to be sent to the United States, for the use of human rights 
and legal researchers’, and that he believed that, ‘combined with the findings of the 
forensic team, we may be able to prepare a powerful legal case against the Iraqi 
government at the International Court of Justice.’ He continued to write that time was 
of the essence because the United Nations Special Representative was preparing his 
report on Iraq, and the documents, once classified and translated, would be of 
immense value to him (Correspondence from Andrew Whitley to Jalal Talabani, 
December 20, 1991). Whitley also wrote to Massoud Barzani, Secretary General of 
the KDP, on December 20, 1991. He mentioned a meeting between Barzani and 
Makiya the month previously during which Makiya had explained that Harvard 
University was working closely with MEW to ensure that ‘the captured Iraqi 
government documents in the hands of the KDP and other Kurdish parties can be 




































































involvement of an academic institution in housing the documents was still being 
considered. However, Whitley pressed Barzani to make a swift decision to permit the 
documents to be taken out of the country due to their potential to contribute to the 
report the UN intended to prepare. Whitley explained that for the first time the UN 
had the opportunity to compile a comprehensive and accurate report on the Baʿth 
regime’s human rights record (Correspondence from Andrew Whitley to Massoud 
Barzani, December 20, 1991). This humanitarian justice imperative, in which the 
documents would be put to use as evidence for a tribunal, took precedence over 
Makiya’s wish for an academic approach to the collections and was the driving force 
that enabled their displacement to the US. However, while HRW published a report in 
1994 on the abuses documented in the records, Bureaucracy of Repression: The Iraqi 
Government in Its Own Words, the international tribunal never took place (HRW 
1994). 
 
Arrival in the US 
In May 1992, the PUK handed over the documents in its possession to US 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee officials. Peter Galbraith, a senior adviser to the 
Foreign Relations Committee who hoped to build a genocide case against the secret 
police and the Baʿth Party, spearheaded the US government’s efforts to remove the 
documents, coordinating with Kurdish officials, Makiya and Whitley. Foreign 
Relations Committee funding enabled the Pentagon to airlift the documents to the US 
(Kaslow 1992). In August 1993, the KDP also signed over the documents it held. In 
the US, the original wooden crates sent by the Kurdish parties were converted into 
cardboard storage boxes that then served as units for processing. These totalled 1,842 




































































held by Kurdish groups was the formation of what became known as the NIDS 
archive. Since the uprising, during which untold quantities of the regime’s records 
from the regions were destroyed, various other influences may have led to losses to 
the collection. The Documents at Hoover Reference Guide suggested that prior to 
arriving in the US, the collections were subjected to three possible truncations. The 
central Iraqi agency staff may have removed documents of a classified or sensitive 
nature before abandoning their offices during the uprising; many of their offices were 
exposed to looting and destruction; and the Kurdish parties may have removed 
material of a sensitive character before handing the documents over to US officials 
(Iraq Documents at Hoover Reference Guide 2013). The archive as an artefact of the 
1991 uprising and its aftermath is a historical record by means of what is absent as 
much as by what is present. Within the US, the archive’s trajectory maps a period 
whereby an entirely different set of imperatives, formed within the context of 
international politics, shaped the archive and defined who controlled it and also its 
interpretive applications. 
 
At this stage, representatives from the US Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee and HRW hoped that by proving that genocide had taken place, charges 
could be brought against Iraq for crimes against humanity (Kaslow 1992). In the US 
under a special arrangement, the Foreign Relations Committee granted HRW access 
to the documents for the purpose of finding evidence of genocide, a project led by 
Joost Hiltermann. In an unprecedented collaboration between a non-governmental 
organization and a government agency, the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 
accessed the documents simultaneously, providing researchers to work alongside 




































































had not been trained as human rights researchers and proved inefficient at finding 
information that could be used in a tribunal. The DIA’s interest, rather, lay in looking 
for evidence of weapons of mass destruction, although this search proved fruitless 
(Joost Hiltermann, email exchange with author, September 15, 2017). The 
cataloguing process imposed a structure on the archive. This consisted of adding an 
index sheet developed by HRW staff to each file. These index sheets catalogued the 
archive according to a human rights imperative in an attempt to render the 
information held in it usable as evidence in a tribunal. The de-territorialization of the 
documents placed the archive into an entirely new framework of discourse that 
dictated its internal organization. As the HRW team progressed with their work, the 
index sheets were further developed in a more detailed manner to reflect the richness 
of the data the documents contain so as not to bury information that might later be 
useful for the Iraqi public (Skype interview with Joost Hiltermann, September 13, 
2017). This shift in approach suggests an acknowledgement of the fact that an 
organizing principle developed at a distance and according to different imperatives 
from the societal discourses of the original context of an archive might impact future 
interactions with the archive. The NIDS was digitized and compiled into 176 CD-
ROMS. The team completed analysis of its genocide research in 1994 and a report 
was published. Despite the long process of cataloguing and scanning, the evidence 
compiled was never used in the way the HRW team had hoped it would be. In a 2000 
report Hiltermann wrote that ‘evidence of human rights abuses has been marshaled 
solely to score political points or to justify military action, and not to hold a vicious 
regime accountable for its crimes.’ The international political will to pursue justice for 
human rights abuses in the courts did not exist. In Hiltermann’s view international 




































































and did not prioritize seeking justice through a legal route that could end with 
Baghdad collapsing and an ensuing power vacuum that might leave space for Iranian 
intervention in Iraq (Hiltermann 2000, 34). 
 
In 1997, Bruce P. Montgomery at the University of Colorado-Boulder was 
granted custody of the original files by the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 
Montgomery had founded what he termed as a human rights archive at Boulder, 
intended to document the post-WWII rise of the human rights movement, its 
development, evolution and gain of influence. Hearing about the NIDS collection, he 
contacted US State Department officials and HRW representatives, through whom he 
liaised with the Kurdish political parties (Interview with Bruce Montgomery, August 
14, 2017). The letter of transfer from the Foreign Relations Committee stated that a 
‘request by the [Kurdish] parties for the return of their documents would be honored’ 
and that this would bind any future custodian of the files. Boulder then received 
custody of the original files and a copy of the 176 CD-ROMS. Montgomery’s aim 
was to expose Hussein’s crimes against the Kurdish people to the world community 
and he intended to enable access to the archive to journalists, human rights groups, 
and the US State Department’s war crimes office. In 1998, a copy of the CD-ROMS 
was also given to the Iraq Research and Documentation Project, an organization 
founded by Kanan Makiya at Harvard University in the wake of his trip to Iraq. This 
copy was later transferred to the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. Copies of 






































































The respective roles of HRW and US academic institutions in cataloging and 
controlling access to the records of a foreign state evidence further aspects of the 
relationship between power and archives. Writing on post-war Bosnia and 
Herzegovina mass atrocity records, Csaba Szilagyi highlights that when documents 
are kept in human rights archives, where they are for the most part inaccessible to 
those whose lives they document, the archiving techniques and descriptive practices 
devised by the institutions that hold the archives focus on the origin and creators of 
the records, rather than on the subjects. As such they do not ‘represent the variety of 
voices, images, and lived experiences contained in mass atrocity records, and often 
reproduce the same unfavorable power relations for victims and survivors that have 
been present at the creation of the records’ (Szilagyi 2018, 131-132). As archival 
scholars Joan Schwartz and Terry Cook argue, archives function to maintain power, 
‘the power of the present to control what is, and will be, known about the past, about 
the power of remembering over forgetting’ (Schwartz and Cook 2002, 3). The 
displacement of the NIDS archive meant that the power to control the history of the 
Kurdish regions under Baʿth governance as documented through the records was far 
beyond the reach of those who lived through it. 
 
Repatriation? 
In 2005, the US Justice Department’s Crimes Liaison Task Force in 
Washington, DC, created to garner evidence for Saddam Hussein’s Baghdad trial after 
the 2003 allied invasion of Iraq, requested possession of the archive from the 
University of Colorado-Boulder. The majority of the original documents were handed 
over (Hennerbichler and Montgomery 2015). They were then sent to the Iraqi High 




































































2005. Hussein was tried for crimes against humanity in relation to the execution of 
148 people in the city of Dujail in 1982. A second, separate tribunal focusing on the 
Anfal campaign began in August 2006, in which Hussein, Ali Hassan al-Majid and 
several other Iraqi officials were tried. Hussein was found guilty and executed for his 
involvement in the Dujail massacre before the Anfal trial was concluded, leading to 
charges against him being dropped in the Anfal case. al-Majid and two others were 
found guilty and sentenced to death. The records sent to Baghdad by the US Justice 
Department have since remained in the custody of the High Tribunal, renamed the 
Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal (Sassoon and Brill 2020 [forthcoming]).  
 
While the majority of the original files are in Baghdad, digitized copies have 
remained under the control of academic and government bodies in the US, with 
academic institutions being at the forefront of decision-making as to the fate of these 
Iraqi state records. In 2014, the University of Colorado-Boulder held a ceremony 
during which a hard drive containing a copy of the 176 CD-ROMS created by the 
DIA and HRW was handed to Kurdish representatives of the Zheen Archive Center, a 
non-governmental institution in Sulaimaniyya. This arrangement was the result of two 
years of negotiations involving academics, Kurdish government representatives and 
US officials, overseen by legal teams (Hennerbichler and Montgomery 2015). 
Montgomery considered the provision of the digitized archive to a Kurdish institution 
to constitute a ‘repatriation’ in that the data the archive contains was sent back to its 
place of origin (Interview with Bruce Montgomery, August 14, 2017). Boulder chose 
to divest itself of its remaining digitized copy and returned it to the US Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee in 2016 (Sassoon and Brill 2020 [forthcoming]). The copy 




































































later reformulated as the Iraq Memory Foundation, is available to researchers through 
the Hoover Institution. The digitized copies of the archive do not convey the physical 
evidence of the conflict held in the original files, but bearing as they do the many 
traces of the political, cultural and socio-economic pressures specific to the context 
within which they were generated and that have defined who now controls them, they 




Approached as an artefact of the 1991 rebellion, the NIDS holds a great deal 
of information further to what might be gleaned as to the ‘bureaucratic machinations’ 
of the Baʿth Party within the records. The ‘odyssey’ of the documents, as 
Montgomery has described their history, exposes the relationship between power and 
archives and how that dynamic is reconfigured through conflict. (Montgomery 2001, 
71, 69). As this article has demonstrated, every stage in the biography of the archive 
left tangible traces of political struggles, defining its shape, its location and the ways 
in which it can be put to use. Analysis of the trajectory of the archive as various 
groups vied to control it has revealed the ways in which power has operated to dictate 
what is and what will be known about the functioning of the Baʿth in the Kurdish 
regions of Iraq.  
 
As Antoinette Burton wrote, all archives come into being in and as history as a 
result of specific political, cultural, and socioeconomic pressures (Burton 2005, 6). 
While critical archival theory was developed in relation to archives that were more 




































































conflict. This framework has allowed a focused examination of the impacts and 
implications of the power struggles at play in the formation and management of 
documentary heritage. Given that historically archives have so regularly been de-
territorialized through war, prized as evidence of atrocities or as an academic 
resource, those in a position to access displaced records should interrogate the 
processes that have defined how the archive is organized and how and to whom 
access to the materials is provided. These processes have functioned to determine how 
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